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1 Andersen and Jordan (1968).
2 See for example Sargent
(1982 and 1986).
3 See for example Tobin (1969),
Brunner and Meltzer (1976),
Wallace (1977), Bryant and
Wallace (1979), and Kareken
and Wallace (1980). 
4 The need for banks to settle
interbank payments in base
money (central bank deposits)
is an important part of the
demand for the monetary base
in countries without reserve
requirements against deposits.
See Bank of Canada (1987,
1989, and 1991). Note that in
these countries all central bank
deposits held by depository
institutions are (voluntary)
clearing balances.  In the
United States, the Federal
Reserve also supplies signiﬁcant
amounts of intra-day Federal
Reserve deposits used for
payments activity.  During
1994, these deposits averaged
approximately $50 billion per
day, or nearly twice the close-
of-business amount of Federal
Reserve deposits included in
the monetary base. See
Richards (1995, p. 1,066). 
5 The terminology of absorption
and liberation of reserves
through changes in legal
reserve ratios can be found in
ofﬁcial Federal Reserve publica-
tions at least as early as 1954.
See Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System
(1954, p. 51).
6 See Burger and Rasche
(1977).
7 An additional difference is the
inclusion of ﬂoat-pricing related
as-of adjustments.
8 The aggregate nominal amount
of required clearing balance
contracts is excluded, rather
than the amount of Federal
Reserve deposits used to satisfy
the contracts, because data on
the latter are not available. 
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T
he Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’
adjusted monetary base has been
widely monitored as an indicator of
Federal Reserve quantitative monetary
policy actions since its introduction in
1968.1 The adjusted monetary base is a
valuable indicator of the stance of mone-
tary policy because extended periods of
rapid growth of the monetary base have
often preceded accelerations of inﬂation 
in the United States and other countries.
Historical evidence also shows that
supportive growth of the monetary base 
is necessary for inﬂation to continue for 
an extended period.2 In addition, the
m o n e t a ry base plays central roles in models
of monetary economies as a default risk-
free asset used for portfolio adjustment,
including satisfying reserve requirements
for depository institutions, and as the
medium for ﬁnal settlement of debts
arising from the exchange of goods 
and services.3 In model and in real
economies, the ability of depository 
institutions to issue new liabilities and
acquire earning assets is limited both 
by reserve requirements and by the
institutions’ need to maintain an adequate
stock of base money to settle interbank
payments.4
The adjusted monetary base combines
in a single index Federal Reserve actions
that affect the supply of base money—
open market operations, discount 
window lending, and unsterilized foreign
exchange market intervention—with
actions that affect depository institutions’
demand for base money—changes in 
statutory reserve requirements.  To
measure the adjusted monetary base, 
we need a mechanism for translating the
e ffects of re s e rve re q u i re m e n t changes 
into “equivalent” changes in the monetary
base, m e a s u red in terms of open market
o p e r a t i o n s or other actions. The reserve
adjustment magnitude (RAM) provides
such a mechanism by measuring the
amount of base money “absorbed” or
“liberated” by the change in require-
m e n t s .5 The adjusted monetary base 
e q u a l s the sum of the monetary base 
and RAM.6
We present in this article a revised
measure of the monetary base and a new
RAM. The revised measure of the mone-
t a ry base differs from the current measure 
by including the aggregate amount of
depository institutions’ required clearing
balance contracts with the Federal
Reserve.7 The c u rrent measure excludes
re q u i red clearing balance contracts from
the monetary base.8 The new RAM diff e r s
f rom the current RAM by recognizing 
that, since the Monetary Control Act o f
1980, an increasing number of depository
institutions have not signiﬁcantly changed
their demand for base money (vault cash
and Federal Reserve deposits) relative 
to transactions deposits following changes
in statutory reserve requirements.  T h e
RAM currently included in the St. Louis
adjusted monetary base is based on an
assumption that all depository institutions
will promptly change their holdings 
of base money following a change in
required reserves due to a change in
reserve requirements.  The new RAM 
seeks to separate those depository
institutions which have responded 
in this way from those institutions 
which have not.
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9 By including all Federal Reserve
deposits, the revised measure
corresponds more closely than
the current measure to the
concepts of the monetary base
discussed by Brunner (1961),
Friedman and Schwartz
(1963), Cagan (1965), and
Balbach and Burger (1976).
10Reserve balances data are
published weekly on the Board
of Governors’ statistical
releases and monthly in the
Federal Reserve Bulletin.
11In addition to the amount 
of required clearing balance
contracts, some other book-
keeping entries are subtracted.
The total of these items is
referred to as service-related
balances and adjustments on
the Board of Governors’ weekly
H.4.1 data release.
12Federal Reserve Bulletin, March
1981, pp. 247-49, and
December 1982, p. 756.
13Nonmember banks held
clearing deposits at Federal
Reserve Banks before the
Monetary Control Act, but the
amounts are small. See Cagan
(1965, p. 335), Friedman and
Schwartz (1963, p. 748), 
and Banking and Monetary
Statistics 1941-1970, (1976,
p. 518).
14In 1977 required reserve ratios
at member banks ranged from
a minimum of 7 percent on the
ﬁrst $2 million of net demand
deposits to 16.25 percent on
net demand deposits in excess
of $400 million.  The required
reserve ratio on savings
deposits was 3 percent and the
reserve requirements on time
deposits maturing in less than
180 days were 3 percent on
the ﬁrst $5 million and 6
percent on time deposits in
excess of $5 million. (See
Federal Reserve Bulletin,
December 1977, p. A9).
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CURRENT AND 
REVISED MEASURES 
OF THE MONETARY BASE:
DIFFERENCES
The current St. Louis monetary 
base equals the sum of reserve balances of
depository institutions at Federal Reserve
Banks plus currency in circulation outside
the Treasury and the Federal Reserve. 
The revised measure of the monetary 
base equals the sum of the Federal Reserve
deposits of depository institutions plus
currency in circulation.9 The currency
component of the monetary base is
unchanged.  The revised measure of the
monetary base differs from the current
measure by including all deposits of
domestic depository institutions at Federal
Reserve Banks, whether used to satisfy
legal reserve requirements, to satisfy
required clearing balance contracts, or 
for any other purpose.  The principle
difference between the current and revised
measures of the monetary base is the
inclusion of the aggregate amount of
depository institutions’ required clearing
balance contracts.
Reserve Balances and Required
Clearing Balance Contracts
Reserve balances is an accounting 
concept intended to measure the aggregate
amount of reserves available to support
depository institutions’ deposits.10 Reserve
balances are measured by subtracting the
aggregate amount of depository institu-
tions’ required clearing balance contracts
from the aggregate amount of their 
Federal Reserve deposits.11
Required clearing balance contracts
were introduced by the Federal Reserve 
in February 1981 after some depository
institutions experienced problems with
overdrafts on their Federal Reserve deposit
accounts.12 Prior to November 1980, the
use of Federal Reserve interbank payment
services (including check clearing and
wire transfer) was the almost exclusive
province of member banks.13 Because the
reserve requirements imposed on member
banks were relatively high, the Federal
Reserve deposits held by member banks
were generally sufﬁcient to absorb the
debits and credits resulting from interbank
payments activity without overdrafts on
their Federal Reserve accounts.14 The
Monetary Control Act reduced reserve
requirements on member banks and also
granted nonmember institutions the right
to use Federal Reserve payments services.
Overdrafts on Federal Reserve accounts
became a problem for some institutions
because the act’s requirements were
phased-in, and many nonmember insti-
tutions initially satisﬁed their reserve
requirements with vault cash. 
The Federal Reserve’s required clearing
balance program began as a way to incre a s e
the amount of Federal Reserve deposits
maintained by depository institutions
without discouraging them from purc h a s i n g
payment services from the Federal Reserve
rather than from private correspondent
banks.  Through negotiation, depositories
were encouraged to enter into contracts
requiring that they maintain additional
deposits at the Federal Reserve, called
required clearing balances, above and
beyond the amount necessary to satisfy
their legal reserve requirements.15 To
offset the opportunity cost of maintaining
these deposits, the Federal Reserve granted
“earnings credits” to the depositories at
approximately the federal funds rate,
similar to the practice of private corre s p o n-
d e n t banks.16 These credits could be used
to defray the cost of Federal Reserve
services but could not be withdrawn in
cash nor used to pay penalties.17
During the 1980s, the required
clearing balance program came to more
closely resemble a voluntary reserve
management tool offered by the Federal
Reserve to depository institutions than an
external, regulatory constraint.  Soon after
its introduction, and especially after the
introduction of contemporaneous reserve
accounting in February 1984, some depos-
itory institutions realized that maintaining
a voluntary required clearing balance con-
tract could simplify the management of
their Federal Reserve deposit account.
The additional Federal Reserve depositsFE D E R A L R E S E RV E BA N K O F S T.  LO U I S
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15Required clearing balance con-
tracts are negotiated because
the Monetary Control Act
prohibits the Federal Reserve
from imposing payments-
related reserve requirements. 
16Analogies between Federal
Reserve deposits and the
deposits of respondents at
correspondent banks also may
account, in part, for the exclu-
sion of required clearing
balance contracts from current
measures of the monetary base
and bank reserves. Antecedents
extend back to the initial three-
year phase-in of the Federal
Reserve Act.  As national banks
“transferred” deposits to the
newly created Reserve Banks,
some historical accounts sug-
gest that the Federal Reserve
failed to fully recognize its role
as the creator rather than the
recipient of these deposits, and
its responsibility for (and ability
to control) the total amount of
such deposits. See Friedman and
Schwartz (1963, pp. 195-6)
and Burgess (1936, chapter 3).
17Earnings credits accrue at the
federal funds rate adjusted for
(implicit) reserve requirements.
See Stevens (1993).
18Feinman (1993) and Hilton,
Cohen, and Koonmen (1993)
survey the growth of required
clearing balance contracts since
1980.
19The 1990-91 reduction in
reserve requirements was fol-
lowed by a signiﬁcant increase
in daylight overdrafts during 
a period when the Federal
Reserve was increasing its scru-
tiny of overdrafts (see Richards,
1995, pp. 1,069-70 and
Figure 3, p. 1,070).  We do
not know if concern regarding
the level of daylight overdrafts
led to increases in Federal
Reserve deposits and required
clearing balance contracts, but
the timing is suggestive.  
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held to satisfy the contract are available 
to make interbank payments in exactly 
the same way as other Federal Reserve
deposits.  Furthermore, the additional
deposits provide a buffer against unantici-
pated increases in reservable deposits or
payments-related debits.  Federal Reserve
accounting rules always ﬁrst apply a
depository’s Federal Reserve deposits to
satisfy the institution’s required reserves,
and only thereafter does the Fed apply 
the remaining deposits to satisfy the insti-
tution’s required clearing balance contract.
Although a shortfall of Federal Reserve
deposits relative to required reserves is
likely to trigger signiﬁcant penalties and
increased regulatory scrutiny, a small
shortfall relative to the amount of their
clearing balance contract incurs no
penalty.  Larger shortfalls relative to the
contracted amount are penalized at either
a 2 percent or 4 percent annual rate, often
less costly than borrowing in the federal
funds market or at the discount window.
The clearing balance program
expanded rapidly during the early 1980s,
and then slowed.18 In March 1981, about
75 depositories had required clearing
balance contracts; by March 1985, about
4,800 depositories had contracted to main-
tain about $1.3 billion in required clearing
balances.  The numbers were about the
same during the third quarter of 1990,
with 4,600 depositories contracted to
maintain about $1.5 billion.  Interestingly,
about half of these institutions apparently
held Federal Reserve deposits solely for
payments activity, since they fully satisﬁed
their required reserves with vault cash.
Both the number of institutions with
contracts and the aggregate amount 
of required clearing balance contracts
increased sharply following the December
1990 - January 1991 and April 1992 reduc-
tions in reserve requirements.19 During
the third quarter of 1992, about 5,000
institutions contracted to maintain about
$5.0 billion, triple the amount of two years
earlier.  Moreover, about two-thirds of
these institutions fully satisﬁed their
reserve requirements with vault cash and
hence likely held Federal Reserve deposits
primarily for payments purposes.  This
apparent substitution by some depository
institutions of voluntary clearing balance
requirements for statutory reserve require-
ments suggests that required clearing
balance contracts should be included 
in the monetary base.
Gilbert (1983, p. 23) provides a clear
statement of the rationale that led in the
early 1980s to the exclusion of required
clearing balance contracts from the current
measure of the monetary base:
Depository institutions maintain
clearing balances at Federal Reserve
Banks as a means of payment for the
fees Federal Reserve Banks now
charge for services.  Depository insti-
tutions receive implicit interest on
their clearing balances at the federal
funds rate, which may be used to 
pay the fees on services.  Required
clearing balances are subtracted in
computing the [monetary] source
base because clearing balances are
part of total reserve balances held 
by depository institutions at Federal
Reserve Banks, but are not related to
the levels of deposit liabilities.20
Gilbert’s argument would be
persuasive if required clearing balances
were a separate, distinct type of deposit 
at Federal Reserve Banks, used solely 
to defray the cost of Federal Reserve
payment-related services.  Some deposi-
tory institutions may indeed have treated
their Federal Reserve deposits used to sat-
isfy clearing balance contracts in this way
during the early 1980s.  For at least the
past decade, however, required clearing
balance contracts have been a ﬂexible,
v o l u n t a ry commitment to maintain a larg e r
Federal Reserve deposit balance than nec-
essary to satisfy required reserves; they 
are neither a distinct type nor separate 
category of deposit.21
The inclusion of clearing balance
contracts also is suggested by Balbach 
and Burger’s (1976, p. 3) conceptual 
basis for identifying and measuring the
monetary base.  The monetary baseFE D E R A L R E S E RV E BA N K O F ST.  LO U I S
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20Authors’ note: Contrary to the
terminology in the quotation,
required clearing balances are
not included in Federal Reserve
data on reserve balances. 
21There is one exception to this
statement.  A nonmember
depository institution may have
a separate clearing balance
deposit account at a Federal
Reserve Bank if it satisﬁes its
required reserves via a pass-
through contract with another
eligible depository institution. 
22Several previous variants of the
Burger-Rasche reserve adjust-
ment magnitude have been
included in the adjusted mone-
tary base since 1980 (see
Gilbert, 1980 and 1987).  
The RAM used from November
1980 through December 1981
excluded both the deposits 
and required reserves of
nonmember institutions on the
grounds that these institutions
seemed likely to satisfy their
initial reserve requirements
with vault cash, and hence their
holdings of base money would
not be affected by changes in
reserve requirements (see
Gilbert, 1980, p. 4).  The RAM
adjustment we present in this
article is conceptually similar 
to that earlier RAM.
23The tests, basically analysis-of-
variance tests, are described in
Anderson and Rasche (1996). 
24Some studies of ﬁrms’ money
demand have noted an analo-
gous result in a different
context: Loan-based compen-
sating balance requirements
were not binding on ﬁrms
during the 1970s when the
ﬁrms’ transactions need for
demand deposits exceeded the
amount of demand deposits
required by the compensating
balance requirement (see
Enzler, Johnson, and Paulus,
1976, p. 274).
25Evidence for the inclusion of
small bound institutions prior to
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can therefore be identiﬁed in any
monetary system by ascertaining and
summing the following:
1. those assets which the consolidated
banking sector [depository institu-
tions] uses to settle interbank 
debt; and
2. those items, aside from bank
[depository institution] liabilities,
which are used as money.
The deposits at Federal Reserve Banks
used to satisfy required clearing balance
contracts fall clearly within this deﬁnition
because the deposits are used to settle
interbank payments.  Indeed, for many
depository institutions during the early
1980s, required clearing balance contracts
arose because the institutions actively used
their Federal Reserve accounts to settle
interbank payments.  Proper measurement
of the monetary base requires the inclu-
sion of deposits at Federal Reserve Banks
that are applied to satisfy required clearing
balance contracts, since these deposits are
available for and used to settle interbank
debts. The omission of required clearing
balances has allowed the current measure
of the monetary base to drift further and
further from its conceptual basis.
The shaded insert, “A Close-Up 
of the Current and Revised Measures of
the Monetary Base”(p.8), provides a
detailed comparison of the current and




Conditional on assumptions about
which types of depository institutions
respond to changes in reserve require-
ments, the RAM translates the effects 
of changes in reserve requirements into
equivalent changes in the monetary base.
Depository institutions hold base money
for three reasons: to satisfy statutory
reserve requirements, to convert retail
deposits into currency on request, and 
to absorb debits and credits due to
interbank payments.  The current RAM
assumes that the quantity of base money
(vault cash and Federal Reserve deposits)
d e p o s i t o ry institutions demand will change
about dollar for dollar with changes in
re q u i red re s e rves due to changes in statutory
reserve requirements.  Although a reason-
able assumption for member banks before
1980, since the Monetary Control Act was
put in place, an increasing number of
depository institutions have not responded
to changes in reserve requirements in the
way the current RAM assumes.
Two Classes of Depository
Institutions
The new RAM presented in this article
is a generalization of the RAM proposed by
Burger and Rasche (1977).22 In that RAM,
depository institutions were separated into
two groups based on the likelihood that a
depository would change its holdings of
vault cash and Federal Reserve deposits
following a change in statutory reserve
requirements.  Member banks, subject to
relatively high statutory Federal Reserve
reserve requirements, were assumed to
reduce their holdings of Federal Reserve
deposits about dollar for dollar with a
change in required reserves due to a
change in statutory requirements.  Non-
member banks and thrifts, not subject 
to Federal Reserve reserve requirements,
were assumed not to respond to changes 
in statutory reserve requirements.  Only
member banks were included in the calcu-
lation of RAM because only at member
banks did changes in reserve requirements
liberate or absorb base money.
The new RAM is constructed from 
a panel data set consisting of individual
depository institution data submitted to
the Federal Reserve weekly since 1980 
by about 12,000 depository institutions.
Absent a fully worked out model of depos-
itory institution reserve management, we
use statistical tests to separate depository
institutions into two classes.23 Institutions
in the ﬁrst class are assumed to respond 
to changes in reserve requirements byFE D E R A L R E S E RV E BA N K O F S T.  LO U I S
7
changing their holdings of Federal Reserve
deposits approximately dollar for dollar
with changes in their required reserves,
and hence are included in the calculation
of RAM.  Institutions in the second class
are assumed to have a business need for
base money that exceeds the amount of
their required reserves.  As a result, the
quantity of base money held by these
institutions is assumed not to vary with
changes in reserve requirements, but
rather to be determined primarily by their
need to convert deposits into currency 
and to settle interbank payments.24
These institutions are omitted from RAM.
For dates following implementation 
of the Monetary Control Act in November
1980, our analysis suggests that three
groups of depository institutions belong 
in the second class, thereby excluding
them from the calculation of RAM:
• Institutions that fully satisﬁed their
required reserves with vault cash 
(or in other words were legally
nonbound), beginning with the
reserve maintenance period ending
November 19, 1980. Our analysis
suggests that these institutions
tended not to adjust their holdings 
of base money, relative to net trans-
actions deposits, following a change
in reserve requirements.  If these
institutions’ vault cash is determined
primarily by their need to convert
customer deposits into currency, it
seems reasonable that their holdings
of base money, including Federal
Reserve deposits, will be insensitive
to changes in reserve requirements.
Since 1985 more than half of the
depositories with required clearing
balance contracts have been legally
nonbound, satisfying their required
reserves with vault cash.
• Institutions that were subject to a
maximum 3 percent marginal reserve
requirement on net transaction
deposits and did not satisfy their
required reserves with vault cash 
(or in other words were legally
bound), beginning with the reserve
maintenance period ending January
7, 1991.  These small bound insti-
tutions are included in the ﬁrst 
class (and hence in RAM) prior 
to January 1991.25
• Institutions with net transactions
deposits of less than about $135 mil-
lion, beginning with the re s e rve mainte-
nance period ending January 7, 1991.2 6
Examination of the responses of these
institutions to the December 1990 -
January 1991 and April 1992 reductions 
in reserve requirements suggests that their
base money holdings were likely determ i n e d
by the business needs of the institutions,
rather than statutory reserve requirements,
after January 1991.
Calculating RAM
The new RAM adjustment is
calculated as follows.  For each week
(through January 1984) or reserve mainte-
nance period (beginning February 1984), 
a reserve adjustment magnitude is
calculated for each institution included 
in RAM by subtracting the institution’s
actual required reserves during that period
from an estimate of what the institution’s
required reserves would have been if the
reserve requirements that prevailed during
the reserve maintenance period ending
January 7, 1991, had been in effect.  This
approach is the Burger-Rasche (1977)
adjustment applied to individual institu-
tions, using the reserve requirements in
effect during the January 7, 1991, reserve
maintenance period as the base period 
for calculation of RAM.  This base period
is convenient because reserve require-
ments on nontransactions deposits and
Eurodollar liabilities at weekly reporting
institutions were reduced to zero on that
date.27 The aggregate RAM for each
reserve maintenance period equals the
sum of the individual reserve adjustment
magnitudes across all depository institu-
tions.  (See the shaded insert, “A Close-Up
of the Current and New RAM,” on p.10.)
January 1991 is weaker than
for the inclusion of other groups
of institutions.  Some tests
suggest that these institutions,
as a group, might be excluded
from RAM beginning in 1980,
as are small nonbound institu-
tions.  As a result, we are
continuing to study and model
the reserve management
behavior of smaller banks.
26The value for 1991 is $135
million.  The value increases
annually by the percentage
increase in the aggregate net
transactions deposits of all
depository institutions.
Although this procedure is
supported by preliminary tests,
we are continuing to study and
model the reserve manage-
ment behavior of these
medium-size banks. 
27Choice of an earlier base period
would have made recomputing
required reserves on nontrans-
actions, as well as transactions
deposits, particularly difﬁcult
during the Monetary Control Act
1980-84 phase-in period for
member banks.  Mergers and
acquisitions also must be
accounted for in computing
RAM.  The required reserves of
a combined institution are
reduced during the eight quar-
ters following an acquisition by
a phase-out of the acquired
institution’s low reserve
tranche.  In our calculations,
we have assumed that an insti-
tution eligible for such 
a tranche loss adjustment in a
maintenance period remains
eligible when the reserve
requirements from January 7,
1991, are applied to that
period, except that the size of
the tranche loss adjustment is
increased or decreased by the
percentage change in the
tranche between that period
and the base period.  We also
omit depository institutions
granted the Federal Reserve’s
“bankers’ bank” exemption
from reserve requirements.
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A CLOSE-UP OF THE CURRENT AND REVISED MEASURES
OF THE MONETARY BASE
The factors that supply 
base money (lines 1 through 4 
in the Table), are unaffected 
by the revision.  The largest
factor, Reserve Bank credit
(line 1), varies directly with
changes in the quantity of
securities held by the Federal
Reserve (line 1a), the amount
of Federal Reserve lending to
ﬁnancial institutions (line 1b),
Federal Reserve ﬂoat (line 1c),
and other assets acquired by
the Federal Reserve (line 1d).
Because the longer term
growth of Reserve Bank credit
is determined almost entirely
by Federal Reserve actions and because Reserve Bank credit supplies about 90 percent
of base money, the Federal Reserve can closely control the long-run growth of the
monetary base.
The current measure of the St. Louis monetary base (line 6) equals the sum of
currency in circulation outside the Treasury and Federal Reserve (line 6a) plus reserve
balances of depository institutions (line 6b).  Uses of base money not included in the
monetary base are shown in line 7.  The revised measure of the monetary base recog-
nizes the similarity of required clearing balance contracts (line 7d) to reserve balances
(line 6b), and the differences between required clearing balance contracts and the other
three excluded uses (lines 7a, b, and c).  First, required clearing balance contracts
represent Federal Reserve deposits of depository institutions, similar to reserve bal-
ances (line 6b); the other excluded uses do not.  Second, depository institutions 
may use the Federal Reserve deposits represented by required clearing balance con-
tracts to make or receive interbank payments in the same way as reserve balances, and
the deposits also may be converted into vault cash as necessary. The other excluded
items cannot.  Finally, the three excluded uses other than required clearing balance
contracts are the actual dollar amounts of base money used (lines 7a, b, and c).  For
required clearing balances, only the contractual amount (line 7d) is excluded, not the
amount of Federal Reserve deposits used to satisfy the contracts.
The revised measure of the monetary base (line 8) includes all Federal Reserve
deposits of domestic depository institutions (line 8b).  Speciﬁcally, required clearing
balance contracts are not subtracted from depository institutions’ Federal Reserve deposits.
The inclusion of required clearing balance contracts increases the amount of Federal
Reserve deposits included in the monetary base (line 8b) by about one-fourth.  Equiva-
lently, about one-ﬁfth of the Federal Reserve deposits held by depository institutions
during December 1995 were not used to satisfy re q u i red re s e rves.  The other uses of base
money excluded from the monetary base (lines 9a, b, and c) are unchanged by the re v i s i o n .
The difference between the current and revised measures of the monetary base
since 1980 is shown in the Figure, and largely reﬂects changes in the aggregate amount
of required clearing balance contracts.
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C urrent and Revised Measures of the Monetary Base, 
December 19 9 5 *
Factors Supplying Base Money
(1) Reserve Bank credit
(a) Securities held by the Federal Reserve 387.132
(b) Loans to depository institutions 0.209
(c) Federal Reserve ﬂoat 1.223
(d) Other Federal Reserve assets 32.212
Total Reserve Bank Credit 420.776
(2) Gold stock 11.050
(3) SDR certiﬁcates 10.168
(4) US Treasury currency and coin outstanding 23.969
Total supply of base money other than Reserve Bank credit 45.187
(5) Total supply of base money 465.963
Factors Using Base Money: Current Measure of the Monetary Base
(6) The Monetary Base: Current Measure
(a) Currency and coin in circulation 419.615
(b) Reserve balances of depository institutions at Federal Reserve Banks 20.402
Total monetary base 440.016
(7) Uses of base money other than as the monetary base
(a) Treasury cash holdings 0.271
(b) Deposits of other than domestic ﬁnancial institutions at Federal Reserve Banks 7.349
(c) Other Federal Reserve liabilities and capital 12.841
(d) Deposits, other than reserve balances, of domestic ﬁnancial institutions
at Federal Reserve Banks, including contractual amount of required clearing balances 5.487
Total other factors using base money 25.947
Factors Using Base Money: Revised Measure of the Monetary Base
(8) The Monetary Base: Revised Measure
(a) Currency and coin in circulation 419.615
(b) Deposits of ﬁnancial institutions at Federal Reserve Banks (revised measure) 25.888
Total monetary base 445.503
(9) Uses other than as the monetary base
(a) Treasury cash 0.271
(b) Deposits of other than domestic ﬁnancial institutions at Federal Reserve Banks 7.349
(c) Other Federal Reserve liabilities and capital 12.841
Total other factors using base money (revised measure) 20.460
* $ billions, not seasonally adjusted.
Components may not add to totals due to rounding.
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
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Current and Revised Adjusted
Reserves: Differences
The new monetary base and RAM
presented in this article change only 
the adjusted reserves component of the
adjusted monetary base (currency in circu-
lation is unchanged).  The current and 
new adjusted reserves series are shown in
Figure 1.  Since the difference between the
levels of the series is largely determined by
the choice of a base period for RAM, it is
differences in the growth rates (not the
levels) of the alternative series that matter.
Year-over-year growth rates are shown in
Figure 2, and the differences between the
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A CLOSE-UP OF THE CURRENT AND NEW RAM
The current and new
RAM are shown in the Figure ,
both series normalized to
equal zero in December 1980.1
The two series begin to diverg e
in 1983, and major diff e re n c e s
appear following reductions
in reserve requirements in
December 1990 - January 1991
and in April 1992.  On the ﬁr s t
of these dates, re s e rve re q u i re-
m e n t s on nonpersonal time
deposits and Eurodollar
borrowings were reduced
from 3 percent to zero. On
the second, the marginal
reserve re q u i rement on net
t r a n s a c t i o n s deposits more
than about $42 million was reduced from 12 percent to 10 percent.  Board of
Governors’ staff estimate that these actions reduced aggregate required reserves by
about $13.2 billion and $8.9 billion, respectively.  Largely reﬂecting the change in
required reserves, the current RAM increases by about $13.1 billion and $9.1 billion
during the same periods, respectively.  The new RAM, which omits depository
institutions estimated to have not responded to the reductions, increases by about
$12.3 billion and $7.3 billion, respectively.2
From January 1936 to October 1980, the revised measure of the St. Louis adjusted
m o n e t a ry base presented in this article is based on the adjusted monetary base developed
by Tatom (1980, Table 1).  Tatom measured RAM in segments, re n o rmalizing RAM when
the stru c t u re of re s e rve re q u i rements changed signiﬁc a n t l y.  Tatom constructed separate
RAM adjustments for 1935-1972, 1972-1974, and 1975-October 1980, chaining these
together to form an adjusted monetary base index.  The new adjusted monetary base
p resented in this article is chained to Ta t o m ’s series in October 1980 using his methodology
and hence has the same growth rate as Ta t o m ’s data from January 1935 - October 1980.3
1 Actual values of the current and revised RAM series are about –$2.2 billion and –$18.5 billion, respectively, in December 1980.
2 Some of our statistical tests suggest that small bound banks should be excluded from RAM before the January 7, 1991, maintenance period.  
A RAM that excludes these institutions increases by $9.9 billion rather than $12.3 billion between December 1990 and January 1991.  
Overall, this alternative RAM closely resembles the one shown in the Figure.  The series is available from us on request.
3 A more detailed description of the chained series is available from us on request.
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growth rates are shown in Figure 3. The
growth of the new adjusted reserves series
accelerates more rapidly than the current
series during periods of ease in monetary
policy such as 1985-87 and 1992-93, and
slows more rapidly during tightening
policy, including 1983-84, 1990-91, and
1994-95.  Overall, the new series suggests
greater swings in the stance of monetary
policy, measured by the growth rate of
adjusted reserves, than does the old.
SUMMARY
We have introduced a new measure 
of the adjusted reserves component of 
the St. Louis adjusted monetary base.  
The new measure reﬂects the signiﬁcant
changes in ﬁnancial markets and insti-
tutions that have occurred since imple-
mentation of the Monetary Control Act 
in 1980.
The deﬁnition of the monetary base 
is revised by including the contractual
amount of required clearing balances 
at Federal Reserve Banks.  Required
clearing balances are not a separate type 
of Federal Reserve deposit, but rather are 
a contractual commitment by a depository
institution to maintain more Federal
Reserve deposits than are necessary to
satisfy the institution’s statutory reserve
requirements.  The deposits used to satisfy
the contract are available for interbank
payments and other business activity of
the depository institution, in the same way
as deposits used to satisfy statutory reserve
requirements.  As such, Federal Reserve
deposits held to meet contractual required
clearing balance contracts belong in the
reserves component of the monetary base.
The new RAM is a generalization of
the RAM proposed by Burger and Rasche
(1977).  The adjustment recognizes that
some depository institutions will not
respond fully, in terms of changing the
quantity of base money demanded, to
reductions in required reserve ratios as is
assumed in the calculation of the current
RAM.  Absent a fully speciﬁed model of
depository institutions’ demand for the
monetary base, the new RAM employs
Figure 1
             
             
     
     
   
   
   
   
   
                                                       
   
   
   
                                                                           
                   
                                                                               
Figure 2
             
             
                   
   
   
   
 
     
                                                                               
                                                                     
                                   
                                                                                                                                             
Figure 3







   
                                                                               
 
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
                                                   
                                                                           
                                                                                                                                             FE D E R A L R E S E RV E B A N K O F S T. L O U I S
12
MA R C H/ AP R I L 1 9 9 6
statistical tests to separate depositories
into two classes.  Institutions in one class
ﬁnd reserve requirements the binding con-
straint on their holdings of base money
and are assumed to reduce their demand
for base money about dollar for dollar with
any reduction in required reserves.  Insti-
tutions in the other class ﬁnd their
demand for base money driven primarily
by the business needs of the depository,
including making interbank payments.  As
a working hypothesis, the quantity of base
money held by institutions in the latter
class is assumed to be insensitive to
changes in reserve requirements.  In
contrast, the current RAM assumes that all
depositories essentially reduce their hold-
ings of base money dollar for dollar with
reductions in required reserves. 
Since the Monetary Control Act was
put in place, many depository institutions
have found their demand for base money
driven more by their retail deposit and
interbank payments activity than by legal
reserve requirements. Ignoring this
change, previous measurements of RAM
have overstated the amount of base money
absorbed or liberated by changes in reserve
requirements. 
The new adjusted reserves data
presented in this article suggest that the
stance of monetary policy, measured by the
growth rate of adjusted reserves, has been
more volatile since 1980 than suggested by
the current measure.  Additional research
will be required to reﬁne the calculation of
RAM and to determine the importance of
the revised data in econometric studies, as
well as the appropriate role of the revised
adjusted monetary base in monetary policy
decision making.
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